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August 6, 2004

In January, former Defence Minister David Pratt wrote a letter to U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that stated:

"It is our intent to negotiate in the coming months a missile defence framework memorandum of understanding with the United States with the objective of including Canada as a participant in the current U.S. missile defence program. In light of the threat involving the proliferation of ballistic missiles, I agree that we should seek to expand our co-operation in the area of missile defence."

At that time, Pratt, a well-known supporter of sending troops to Iraq, insisted that the letter was merely a way for Canada to acquire more information in order to decide whether to participate or not.

If indeed Mr. Pratt was only on a "fact-finding" mission, then yesterday's decision by current Defence Minister Bill Graham should not be mistaken as anything else but passive adherence to the U.S. plan.

The Canadian government announced that Canada has agreed to allow the United States to use NORAD's early missile warning system when it deploys ballistic missile interceptors this fall.  In the ensuing media scrum, Graham valiantly tried to convince Canadians that "we would only be in the business of transmitting information," claiming that the decision "does not affect or in any way determine the ultimate decision of whether Canada will participate in missile defence." 

But more than that, this next line of reasoning by Graham demonstrates how truly weak Canada's foreign policy has become under the short reign of the Martin government.

"What this does is preserves NORAD and, in fact, gives us our option to either participate or not participate. If we had decided not to do this today, that would have foreclosed our options because then the Americans would have built an alternative system and there wouldn't have been any role for Canada whatsoever."

There are so many questions that just leap out after reviewing Ottawa's muddled and confused position:

How can Canada still be considered a non-participant if it is supplying vital information that identifies targets for the ballistic missile defence shield?

How can NORAD still be considered an independent body with such close links to the ballistic missile defence program?

How can Graham justify Canada's role in this information exchange when the entire premise behind this decision is based on the fear of unilateral action by the United States?  And, why aren't we able to take a stand against this kind of maverick U.S. foreign policy?

How long can the Canadian government keep up the charade of claiming that a decision regarding the country's participation in ballistic missile defence is still pending?

How do such decisions affect our relatively positive standing amongst the international community?

And on, and on, and on the questions continue to flow.

This kind of policy making is the most cowardly a government can engage in. Everything but a signature on the dotted line indicates that Canada has become a full-fledged partner, and yet the government continues to deny this designation in the midst of a very public game of international footsies between Paul Martin and George W. Bush

If Mr. Martin thinks that he can slip such a monumental policy decision in through the back door, then he is in for a rude awakening.  Canadians do not support the U.S.'s war on terror, and they certainly do not advocate measures that set off an international arms race.

Red usually means "STOP", and green generally indicates "GO".  The colour orange, on the other hand, will now forever be associated with "FEAR" thanks to the ongoing U.S. terror alerts. 

And with the way Paul Martin is laying the foundation for Canada's bilateral relations with the United States, it seems as though the American public aren't the only ones running scared these days.

Comments? jonathan@tdhstrategies.com